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SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT: AN OVERVIEW
AND ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Two Spanish-speaking defendants agree to exchange
methamphetamine for guns with a government agent who does not
speak Spanish.' It is not clear whether the defendants negotiated for
any particular type of gun because the government refuses to release the
identity of the informant who arranged the transactions.2 At the
meeting, the agent gives the defendants a closed bag containing two
machine guns.3 The defendants do not realize the bag contains machine
guns.' The defendants are then arrested The defendants are charged
and convicted with the crime of "use of a firearm in drug trafficking."6
Because the firearms are machine guns, the defendants are given a
mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years to run consecutively with
their other sentences If the weapons had been handguns instead of
machine guns, the defendants would have faced a mandatory sentence
of only five years
A defendant agrees to sell cocaine to an undercover drug
enforcement agent, but first the agent insists that the defendant "cook"
the cocaine into cocaine-base (crack).9 The agent waits in his car for a
few minutes while the defendant goes inside and cooks the cocaine into
1. United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1503 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 1505.
3. Id. at 1503.
4. Id. at 1504.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1505.
8. Id. at 1507.
9. United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 102 F.3d
553 (D.C. Cir. 1996). According to footnote (D) of the drug quantity table, "'[c]ocaine base,'
for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is the street name for a form of
cocaine base.., usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2001) (for brevity, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines will be abbreviated within this Comment as "USSG").
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crack-placing it in a microwave for a few minutes. ° If the defendant
had sold the agent cocaine in its powder form, she would have received
a sentence of sixty months, but because she cooked the cocaine into
crack, she faced a sentence of 120-135 months." This agent "insisted on
the conversion of cocaine to crack because he was aware of the heavier
sentences.' 2 In fact, it was office policy to request the conversion of
cocaine to crack in order to increase defendants' sentences. 3
Over the course of five weeks, a defendant sells crack seven times to
an undercover officer. 4 At the sentencing hearing, it is determined that
the defendant sold 50.4 grams of crack to the officer. 5 An offense
involving over fifty grams of crack carries a mandatory minimum
penalty of ten years. 6 There is evidence that the officer continued to do
business until over fifty grams of crack were involved because the officer
knew that the sale of over fifty grams of crack would double the
defendant's sentence.
These three examples illustrate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
"terrifying capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based on
[an] investigating officer's determination."" Each of these fact patterns
demonstrates the difficult scenario in which a defendant has
undoubtedly committed a crime, but law enforcement has arguably
acted to increase the defendant's penalty. Fact situations like these have
engendered the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, also known as
sentencing factor manipulation.'9
This Comment will examine the way federal courts define and apply
this doctrine. Part II provides a brief overview of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the grounds for departure from those
10. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 108.
11. Id. at 106. For a discussion of the disparity between crack and cocaine sentences and
the federal courts' reluctance to depart based on that disparity despite the sentencing
commission's suggestion that the disparity is too great, see THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL.,
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 368-70 (2001).
12. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 109.
13. Id.
14. United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 1993).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992).
18. Id.
19. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms "sentencing factor manipulation" and
"sentencing entrapment" will be used interchangeably. However, some circuits do distinguish
between the two terms. See infra Part lI.D.
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Guidelines. Part II also defines sentencing entrapment and sentencing
factor manipulation. Part III surveys the varying approaches the federal
courts have taken to this doctrine: a subjective approach, an objective
approach, a rejection of the doctrine altogether, and avoidance of the
decision regarding the doctrine's validity. Part IV examines the policies
for and against applying an approach that scrutinizes the defendant's
intent (a subjective approach) and one that scrutinizes law
enforcement's actions (an objective approach). Part IV also considers
which approach is most consistent with the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and briefly considers other possible solutions.
II. A BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES-THE NEED FOR THE DOCTRINE
To understand sentencing entrapment, it is helpful first to examine
the basic structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)
and the practice of "downward departures" from the Guidelines. Part A
provides a brief synopsis of the Guidelines, while Part B examines the
grounds for departure from the Guidelines. Additionally, to understand
sentencing entrapment, it is helpful to examine the definition of the
traditional form of entrapment and how sentencing entrapment and
sentencing factor manipulation are similarly derived. Part C explores
the definition of the traditional form of entrapment while Part D
provides definitions of sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor
manipulation.
A. A Brief History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Before enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had almost
completely unfettered discretion in imposing sentences, the exercise of
which was generally not reviewable on appeal.' This in turn led to great
disparity in sentences." By the 1970s, scholars and practitioners became
concerned with these disparities. They were particularly concerned
20. Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence
That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21,25 (2000).
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. Many feel that the Guidelines have not eliminated disparities in sentences. See,
e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 102 F.3d 553
(D.C. Cir. 1996). In Shepherd, Judge Greene argues that instead of reducing disparities, the
Guidelines have shifted the "ability to achieve disparity ... from judges [] who are generally
experienced men and women ... to Assistant U.S. Attorneys-who, whatever their individual
intelligence and achievements, have been by and large but a brief period out of law school."
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with the lack of predictability and the possibility that factors such as race
and gender accounted for these disparities.3 To address this issue,
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.24 The purpose of
the Act was to establish uniform guidelines, while in certain
circumstances allowing for departures above and below the guidelines.25
B. Downward Departures
The Sentencing Commission" views downward departures "as a
dangerous necessity whose scope and significance need[s] to be
narrowly conceived and greatly confined."27 The Guidelines only permit
district courts to depart downward "in cases that feature... mitigating
circumstances of a kind or degree not adequately taken into
consideration by the [Sentencing] Commission."28  Today, downward
departures are relatively rare, although the number of downward
departures varies greatly by circuit.29
The statutory basis which provides for departure from the
Guidelines is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). It states:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
Id. at 112.
23. Berman, supra note 20, at 26-27.
24. Id. at 37. For a detailed explanation of the legislative history of federal sentencing
reform, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). Federal
sentencing reform legislation has a long and tortured history from its introduction by Senator
Edward Kennedy in 1975 to its passage nine years later. See id. at 223.
25. See Berman, supra note 20, at 36-41. For an overview of how sentences are
calculated under the Guidelines, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURt §
26.3(e) (3d ed. 2000).
26. The Sentencing Commission is an independent agency within the judicial branch
comprised "of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members. Its principal purpose is
to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will
assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate
sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." USSG ch. 1, pt. A.1 (2001).
27. Berman, supra note 20, at 45 (footnote omitted).
28. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996).
29. Berman, supra note 20, at 82-83. Departure rates in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits ranged from 3.6% to 5.2% in 1998, while the Second and Ninth Circuits had
departure rates over 20%. Id.
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result in a sentence different from that described. In determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration,
the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing
Commission."3
Section 3553(b) clearly implies that a court cannot consider extrinsic
factors in departing from the Guidelines." Section 5K2.0 of the
Guidelines further describes what a court may consider in departing
from the Guidelines. 2 The policy statement to Section 5K2.0 suggests
three situations in which a court may depart from the Guidelines.3
First, a court may depart if there is a factor that has not been adequately
considered by the Sentencing Commission." Second, a court may depart
even if the factor is considered by the Commission, "if the court
determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the weight attached
to that factor under the guidelines is inadequate or excessive. ""
However, that factor must be "present to a degree substantially in
excess of that which is ordinarily involved in the offense. '3 6 Finally, a
third situation in which a court may depart is if there is "an offender
characteristic or other circumstance that is ... 'not ordinarily relevant'"
but is "present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the
'heartland' [of] cases covered by the guidelines.""7  This type of
departure is also termed an "outside the heartland" departure.
Regardless of the grounds for departure, a departure must have a basis
in either the Guidelines themselves or in the official statements of the
Sentencing Commission. 9
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
31. See id.






38. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996); see also infra Part IV.C for a
discussion of using an outside-the-heartland departure in the sentencing entrapment context.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000). Factors that may be considered in departing upward or
downward from the Guidelines include: death, physical injury, extreme psychological injury,
abduction or unlawful restraint, property damage, weapons, disruption of government
function, extreme conduct, criminal purpose, victim's conduct, lesser harms, coercion and
duress, and diminished capacity, public welfare, voluntary disclosure of offense, gang
membership, aberrant behavior, and dismissed and uncharged conduct. USSG §§ 5k.2.1.to
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Sentencing entrapment and manipulation are not common grounds
for downward departures. However, some courts have used the
application notes in Section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines ' as a statutory basis
for a downward departure based on sentencing entrapment or
manipulation in drug cases." Application Note Fourteen (Note
Fourteen) states:
If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government
agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a
defendant), the court finds that the government agent set a price
for the controlled substance that was substantially below the
market value of the controlled substance, thereby leading to the
defendant's purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the
controlled substance than his available resources would have
allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set
by the government agent, a downward departure may be
warranted .42
Application Note Twelve (Note Twelve) states that generally in a
reverse sting operation a defendant should be held responsible for the
drugs he agreed to sell to law enforcement.43 However, if the defendant
shows that he "did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable
of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance,"
then the court must exclude that amount "from the offense level
determination."" One distinction between Notes Twelve and Fourteen
is that the language of Note Twelve indicates the judge "shall exclude"
the weight of the drugs,45 while Note Fourteen suggests that in a reverse
5K2.18, 5K2.20 to 5K2.21. But see Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (factors that are not mentioned in the
Guidelines may be contemplated if the court considers "'the structure and theory of both
relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole."').
40. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. nn.12, 14. In the 2001 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,
Note Fourteen was renumbered. Before 2001, Note Fourteen was Note Fifteen. The text was
not altered. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.15 (2000). Notes Twelve and Fourteen serve as a
statutory basis for entrapment in cases involving drugs because § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines only
applies to drug offenses. See USSG § 2D1.1 (2001).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096,1099 (8th Cir. 2000).
42. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.14. In a reverse sting "the government agent provides the
agreed-upon quantity of controlled substances to a buyer for a prearranged price" instead of
the norm, which is where the "government agent... buys... an agreed-upon quantity of a
controlled substance." United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 252 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
43. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12.
44. Id.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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sting "a downward departure may be warranted.' ' 46 Therefore, Note
Twelve mandates a downward departure, while a departure is merely
discretionary under Note Fourteen. One possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that Note Twelve applies to agreements to sell drugs-the
drugs never need to be sold to law enforcement-while Note Fourteen
is applicable to completed transactions-the defendant buys drugs, albeit
for a very low price.47
C. Entrapment Generally
Sentencing entrapment may be characterized as an outgrowth of the
affirmative defense of entrapment. The salient distinction between
sentencing entrapment and entrapment is that entrapment is a defense
to a crime, while sentencing entrapment merely lowers a defendant's
sentence.4 Many of the same policies support both concepts. 49  The
federal system applies a subjective approach to entrapment:0 "[A] valid
entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement
of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to
engage in this criminal conduct."'" However, the focus is on whether the
defendant had the requisite intent to commit the crime. Entrapment is
"a relatively limited defense" predicated on "the notion that Congress
could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to
commit them by the Government." 3  Thus, "'to determine whether
entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.' "54
The relevant distinction between entrapment and sentencing
entrapment lies within the degree of intent. For example, a defendant
who raises the defense of entrapment is arguing that he did not have the
requisite intent to commit that crime at all; in contrast, a defendant who
46. Id. at n.14 (emphasis added).
47. See id. at nn.12, 14.
48. See Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988); USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. nn.12, 14.
49. For a discussion of the underlying polices of sentencing entrapment and its analogies
to traditional entrapment, see infra Parts IV.A-B.
50. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2(a). However, a growing number of jurisdictions are
focusing on the government's conduct and adopting an objective approach to entrapment.
See id. § 5.2(b).
51. Matthews, 485 U.S. at 62 (citations omitted).
52. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,429 (1973).
53. Id. at 435.
54. Id. at 429 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
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argues sentencing entrapment is asserting only that he did not have the
intent to commit that serious of a crime.5 As such, entrapment is a
complete defense to a crime 6 while a finding of sentencing entrapment
only warrants a lower sentence. This may explain why it is exceedingly
difficult for a defendant to prevail on a sentencing entrapment claim.
D. Sentencing Entrapment
A definition for sentencing entrapment is difficult to synthesize
because there is much variance among the courts.57  Black's Law
Dictionary defines sentencing entrapment as "[e]ntrapment of a
defendant who is predisposed to commit a lesser offense but who is
unlawfully induced to commit a more serious offense that carries a more
severe sentence."58 Within the context of drug crimes, the basic premise
of sentencing entrapment is that the Guideline's practice of correlating
the sentence to the weight of the drugs involved encourages federal
agents to induce defendants to buy or sell large amounts of drugs merely
to increase sentences.
Some courts recognize sentencing factor manipulation as a doctrine
distinct from sentencing entrapment:" "Sentencing manipulation occurs
when the government engages in improper conduct that has the effect of
increasing the defendant's sentence."6' In these circuits, sentencing
factor manipulation is distinct from sentencing entrapment, which
focuses on a defendant's predisposition.2  Circuits that recognize
55. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (7th ed. 1999).
56. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988).
57. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (7th ed. 1999).
59. ROBERT W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK
1135 (Nov. 2000). Of course, defendants make sentencing entrapment arguments in contexts
other than drug crimes. For example, in United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez, 277 F.3d 73, 80
(1st Cir. 2002), a dairy farmer argued that there was sentencing entrapment because the
government discovered that he had adulterated milk before he put it in the silo, but waited
until after the milk was in the silo to arrest him, thus increasing the volume of tainted milk
and his sentence.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Rizzo, 121 F.3d 794, 801 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 1996). Black's does not recognize this distinction and notes
that sentencing entrapment can also be termed "sentencing factor manipulation." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (7th ed. 1999).
61. United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Garcia
holds that sentencing manipulation is not a valid defense. Id. at 76.
62. See id. at 75; United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
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sentencing factor manipulation as a distinct doctrine or those that apply
an objective standard to sentencing entrapment generally analyze the
government's conduct under the rubric of "outrageous [government]
conduct."63 As noted earlier, this Comment will use the terms
"sentencing entrapment" and "sentencing factor manipulation"
interchangeably.64
III. APPROACHES TO SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT
Courts have taken four general approaches to determinations of
sentencing entrapment. One approach is to apply a subjective test, two
circuits apply an objective test, while still other circuits either do not
recognize the doctrine or have not yet decided the issue. Some circuits
have also changed their approaches over time, applied multiple
approaches, or recognized either sentencing entrapment or
manipulation, but not both. This section provides an overview of these
four approaches and demonstrates the varying applications of
sentencing entrapment by circuit and sometimes within a circuit.
A. Subjective Determination
The D.C. Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit embrace a
subjective approach to sentencing entrapment.65 Under a subjective
approach, a court must determine whether the defendant had the
subjective intent to commit the more serious crime.66 In other words, a
court asks whether the defendant had the intent to commit the more
serious crime or merely the intent to commit some lesser crime.
v. Shepherd, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993). Some circuits do not recognize a distinction
between sentencing manipulation and entrapment. United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 93 (2d
Cir. 2000) (holding that if sentencing manipulation or entrapment are valid grounds for
departure the defendant would need to show outrageous government conduct).
63. See, e.g., Lacey, 86 F.3d at 963-64. The idea of outrageous government conduct was
first introduced in United States v. Russell, in which the Court envisioned the possibility of a
situation "in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction." 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). However, Russell aside, outrageous government
conduct to date has been used in a limited fashion. In fact, the Seventh Circuit held that
outrageous government conduct "does not exist in this circuit." United States v. Boyd, 55
F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
64. See supra note 19.
65. See United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
66. See, e.g., Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1101; Parrilla, 114 F.3d at 127; Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329.
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The D.C. Circuit has generally endorsed a subjective approach to
sentencing entrapment because the key element in any entrapment
claim is a defendant's predisposition.67 The D.C. Circuit is wary of using
sentencing entrapment as a means to influence law enforcement
activities68 because "we [can] conceive of no basis for allowing
[outrageous government conduct] or some variant of it, to reduce a
defendant's sentence. ,
69
The Ninth Circuit also generally focuses on a defendant's
intent-the defendant must "demonstrate a lack of predisposition" to
succeed on a sentencing entrapment claim.0 However, when a
defendant received machine guns in exchange for drugs and it was not
clear that the defendant realized that the weapons in the bag were
machines guns (which carry a much greater mandatory minimum
sentence than other firearms), the Ninth Circuit was willing to consider
the government's conduct in addition to the defendant's predisposition.7
The Ninth Circuit also requires a judge to make an express factual
finding stating the reasons for rejecting sentencing entrapment claims.
The Eighth Circuit's "sentencing entrapment analysis [also] focuses
on the defendant's predisposition."73 Outrageous government conduct is
not a consideration.74 Rather, "the government's conduct is relevant in a
sentencing entrapment analysis, but only insofar as it provides the
inducement."75 The defendant bears the burden of "establish[ing] by a
preponderance of the evidence a lack of predisposition to commit the
crime."76 However, other circuits disagree with the subjective approach
and consider the government's conduct.
B. Objective Determination
The First and Tenth Circuits take a different approach and focus on
67. Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329. But see United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111
(D.D.C. 1994) (applying an objective approach), vacated by 102 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
68. Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329.
69. Id. at 1330.
70. Parrilla, 114 F.3d at 127 (explaining United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
71. United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1506-08 (9th Cir. 1997).
72. Naranjo, 52 F.3d at 251.
73. United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2000).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Searcy, 284 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2002).
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the government's conduct.77 The objective approach scrutinizes the
government's conduct to determine if the government acted in a manner
that was so inappropriate as to warrant a downward departure.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that sentencing factor manipulation
"should be analyzed under [an] established outrageous [government]
conduct standard."79 In the Tenth Circuit, outrageous government
conduct is a narrow doctrine that has never been applied "due in
primary part to the reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the
motives and tactics of law enforcement officials. "8 0
To prove sentencing factor manipulation in the First Circuit, the
defendant has the burden of showing the government acted in bad
faith.81 The government's actions must amount to "'extraordinary
misconduct.' 82 The First Circuit's standard to prevail on sentencing
factor manipulation is "high because we are talking about a reduction at
sentencing, in the teeth of a statute or guideline approved by
Congress.... The standard is general because it is designed for a vast
range of circumstances and of incommensurable variables."83 The most
important variable is the government's conduct, "including the reasons
why its agents enlarged or prolonged the criminal conduct in question." 4
The defendant's predisposition to commit the crime is marginally
relevant in this analysis, but the defendant must show more than just a
lack of intent to commit a certain number of transactions.85
As previously discussed, the D.C. Circuit generally applies a
subjective test. However, a D.C. District judge found that a law
enforcement agent's insistence that cocaine be cooked into crack, solely
77. See United States v. Rizzo, 121 F.3d 794, 801 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Lacey,
86 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
Additionally, despite the D.C. Circuit's general endorsement of the subjective approach, a
D.C. district judge applied an objective approach to sentencing entrapment but was
overturned on appeal for not applying a subjective approach. See United States v. Shepherd,
857 F. Supp. 105, 111(D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 102 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
78. See, e.g., Rizzo, 121 F.3d at 801; Lacey, 86 F.3d at 964; Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4.
79. Lacey, 86 F.3d at 963.
80. Id. at 964.
81. Rizzo, 121 F.3d at 801.
82. Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4 (quoting United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir.
1994)); see also United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Woods,
210 F.3d 70, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2000).
83. Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's subjective approach.
20031
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
to increase the defendant's punishment, amounted to outrageous
conduct and constituted either sentencing entrapment or manipulation.87
The court opined that the government's conduct was relevant because
the "practical effect" of the drug sentencing guidelines "is to vest the
power of sentencing in the police officer on the street-even further
removed from the judicial arena where it has traditionally reposed."88
The D.C. Circuit overruled the district judge, suggesting that generally
in entrapment or manipulation cases the defendant's intent should be
the focus. To consider government conduct, the conduct would need
to be so outrageous as to constitute a due process violation, and selling a
government agent crack instead of cocaine does not rise to that level."
C. Courts That Have Rejected the Doctrine Altogether
While it is quite difficult to prove sentencing entrapment under both
the subjective and objective approaches, some jurisdictions have ruled
there is not a place for the doctrine of sentencing entrapment at all.
These circuits opine that it is not the place of the federal courts to adjust
a sentence in a sentencing entrapment scenario.
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected sentencing entrapment as a matter
of law because, in its analysis, the Guidelines do not authorize such a
departure.9" The Eleventh Circuit labels sentencing entrapment a
"defunct doctrine" and opines that an entrapment argument is only
relevant when it serves as a complete defense to the crime." However,
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that if sentencing entrapment were a
valid doctrine it would apply the same test it applies to a traditional
entrapment defense. Namely, the defendant would have to show "1)
government inducement of the crime, and 2) [a] lack of
87. United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111(D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 102 F.3d
558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 112.
89. United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
90. Id.
91. United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 817-18 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit
considers sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment as distinct doctrines. It has left
open the possibility that sentencing manipulation may be a valid defense. See United States
v. Govan, 293 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002).
92. Miller, 71 F.3d at 817-18; see also United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th
Cir. 1992).




The Seventh Circuit has similarly rejected sentencing manipulation
because a defendant has no right to be arrested as soon as there is
probable cause.95 It is permissible for a government agent to wait to
arrest someone until after there is probable cause even if the person
continues to commit an act that increases his exposure at sentencing.96
The Seventh Circuit is reluctant to take away law enforcement's
discretion in deciding when to arrest someone because the police may
need additional time to understand the scope of the criminal activity,
catch others who are involved, or simply "allow the suspect enough
'rope to hang himself.'"97 The Seventh Circuit's approach suggests that
sentencing manipulation might be a viable claim if the timing of arrest
were not at issue. However, the Seventh Circuit, like several of its
sister circuits, has not clearly addressed this issue."
D. Courts That Have Not Decided
Several circuits have considered the issue of sentencing entrapment
but have declined to decide if it is a valid basis for a downward
departure."°  The Fifth Circuit refuses to consider sentencing
entrapment cases on appeal because it believes it lacks jurisdiction to
review sentencing entrapment claims.10' The Fifth Circuit will "'review a
defendant's challenge to a sentence only if it was imposed in violation of
law; was imposed as a result of a misapplication of the sentencing
guidelines.., or was imposed for an offense for which there is no
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.' '"1°, As alluded to
94. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1995)).
95. United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74,76 (7th Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Baker,
63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
96. Garcia, 79 F.3d at 76.
97. Id.
98. See id. In United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002), the
Seventh Circuit hinted that sentencing entrapment is a viable defense as it set out a subjective
standard for proving sentencing entrapment. However, it did not find that sentencfng
entrapment had occurred because the defendant failed to show a lack of predisposition to
commit the crime. Id.
99. See United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 477 (7th Cir. 2001).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Duverge Perez, 295 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1280
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994).
101. See United States v. Ogbonna, 184 F.3d 447,451 (5th Cir. 1999).
102. Id. (quoting United States v. DiMarco, 46 F.3d 476, 477 (5th Cir. 1995)); accord
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above, the Seventh Circuit has declined to decide whether Notes Twelve
and Fourteen address sentencing entrapment. 03
There are several possible reasons why some circuits have declined
to decide whether to allow sentencing entrapment claims. One may be
that these circuits do not want a flood of claims. These circuits may also
want to retain the option to use the doctrine in a limited fashion if there
is ever a situation where the government's conduct is truly outrageous.
Perhaps the right case has yet to come before these courts.
Furthermore, because the sentencing decisions of district judges are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, °4 it is difficult for an
appeals court to find sentencing entrapment unless the trial court finds
sentencing entrapment. Therefore, if trial courts in certain circuits are
not receptive to sentencing entrapment claims, the issue will not come
before the court of appeals in those circuits.
The disparate approaches taken by federal courts to claims of
sentencing entrapment demonstrates the contentious nature of the issue,
as well as the range of policy considerations that influence each court
that faces this difficult issue.
IV. THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE
APPROACHES
This section examines the policy considerations that underlie courts'
application of sentencing entrapment claims. Specifically, this section
examines the subjective and objective approaches in detail, focusing on
the policy considerations for and against applying both approaches.
This section also briefly examines using an "outside the heartland"
departure' in the sentencing entrapment context.
A. The Subjective Approach
In addition to statutory support, there are several valid policy
reasons for considering a defendant's intent under the subjective
approach to sentencing entrapment. However, criticisms of the
subjective approach include that it subverts the intent of the Guidelines
United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 503 (6th Cir. 1999). But see Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (finding that a district court's decision to depart should be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard).
103. Estrada, 256 F.3d at 477.
104. Koon, 518 U.S. at 100.
105. See USSG § 5K2.0 (2001); see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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and that the quantity of criminal intent is not a relevant consideration
for a departure.
The statutory support for the subjective approach in drug cases is
found in Notes Twelve and Fourteen. 'O Note Twelve states that if "the
defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide.., the
agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall
exclude [that amount] from the offense level determination."'0° The text
of Note Twelve focuses on the defendant's intent, and the government's
conduct is not a relevant element.' Note Fourteen authorizes a
departure when the government sets an artificially low price for a drug,
which thereby allows a defendant to purchase a "significantly greater
quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would
have allowed him to purchase.'1 ° Note Fourteen does not expressly
mention intent;11 however, the focus is on the defendant's resources, not
the government's conduct."' Because of this support in the Application
Notes, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]he sentencing entrapment
analysis focuses on the defendant's predisposition.... [T]he
government's conduct is relevant in a sentencing entrapment analysis,
but only insofar as it provides the inducement. ,,112
The most germane policy argument for considering a defendant's
culpability is that the concept of punishing only those who are culpable
and have some level of scienter is a fundamental principle in American
criminal law."3 One reason some circuits believe it is appropriate to
consider a defendant's culpability is that, before the Guidelines, "courts
106. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. nn.12, 14; United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th
Cir. 2000).
107. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12 (emphasis added).
108. See id.; Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1101.
109. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.14.
110. See id.
111. See id.; United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77,89 (D. Mass. 2001).
112. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1101.
113. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-60 (1952) (exploring the roots of
the scienter requirement in English common law and American jurisprudence).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Id. at 250. "Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of
an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and
took deep and early root in American soil." Id. at 251-52.
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were able to ensure that defendants' prison terms did not exceed their
culpability.""' Because judges could adjust a sentence to reflect a
defendant's culpability level, sentencing entrapment was not an issue."5
Under the current system, where drug sentences are based on weight, a
judge's discretion is limited. Further, "the entrapment doctrine [which
was] designed for the previous system no longer adequately protects
against government abuse nor ensures that defendants will be sentenced
on the basis of the extent of their culpability.""16 Because judges no
longer have discretion to adjust a sentence based on the defendant's
intent, the doctrine of sentencing entrapment is necessary to deter
government abuse and ensure that the "government has some reason to
believe that defendants are predisposed to engage in a drug deal of the
magnitude for which they are prosecuted.',1 7 Downward departures for
sentencing entrapment can help curb inappropriate government conduct
and "ensure that sentences imposed reflect the defendants' degree of
culpability. " '
As discussed above, the statutory support for departing based on
intent is found in Note Fourteen,"9 which "recognizes that law
enforcement agents should not be allowed to structure sting operations
in such a way as to maximize sentences imposed on defendants,... and
that courts may" consider a defendant's intent.20 However, the Ninth
Circuit has extended the application of Note Fourteen' beyond reverse
sting operations to situations where law enforcement exercises
"unwarranted pressure on a defendant in order to increase his or her
sentence without regard for his predisposition, his capacity to commit
the crime on his own, and the extent of his culpability."'22 If a departure
based on the defendant's intent were not permitted, the power to
determine a sentence would essentially reside with individual law
enforcement agents.' The difficulty with the Ninth Circuit's approach
114. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); accord United States v.
Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1997).
115. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1106.
116. Id. at 1107.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.14 (2001).
120. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107.
121. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.14.




is that it overreaches the statutory authority to depart found in Notes
Twelve and Fourteen.
In United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, the Ninth Circuit addressed a
situation that provided compelling reasons to consider the defendant's
knowledge of the facts. 24 Ramirez-Rangel presented a situation where
the defendants were exposed to twenty-five additional years in prison
because they received machine guns from the ATF. 25 However, it was
not clear whether the defendants had bargained for machine guns or in
fact knew they had received them."6 The court opined that the
defendants should not face an enlarged sentence when it was possible
that they "neither agreed nor knew that machine guns were involved.""'
In this situation, even proving that "the defendants were predisposed to
deal in machine guns would not justify the larger sentence" because
"[t]he government ought not to be able to commit an entire act for a
defendant without the defendant's knowledge, in order to increase a
penalty by 25 years."'m This holding is unique in that it implies that the
defendant's intent is not the only material factor; rather, his knowledge
of the surrounding circumstances (the machine guns) must be
considered as well. 9
There are, however, several compelling policy reasons not to
consider a defendant's intent. The first of these is the argument that the
judiciary is subverting the intent of the Guidelines when it departs based
on a defendant's lack of intent. The Seventh Circuit subscribes to the
belief that a judge does not have "an equitable power to sentence a
defendant as if the defendant had committed the crime he preferred to
commit, rather than the crime he actually committed. 'As-if' sentencing
is not authorized by federal law. "13
0
A second criticism of the subjective approach is that comparing
sentencing entrapment to traditional entrapment is not a valid analogy.
The First Circuit has succinctly stated this objection to the subjective
approach:
124. United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of
the facts of this case, see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
125. 103 F.3d at 1503-07.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1507.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. United States v. Wilson, 129 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1997).
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[T]he analogy at sentencing to ordinary entrapment is not often
going to help a defendant who is arguing only about the number
or size of the transactions. Having crossed the reasonably bright
line between guilt and innocence, such a defendant's criminal
inclination has already been established, and the extent of the
crime is more likely to be a matter of opportunity than of
scruple.'31
The alternative approach is to consider the government's conduct,
but this approach raises serious concerns as well.
B. The Objective Approach
Considering the government's conduct when granting downward
departures raises important systematic questions. This section examines
the policy reasons against considering the government's conduct,
reasons to consider the government's conduct, and the particular issues
the outrageous government conduct standard raises.
The first criticism of examining the government's conduct is the
argument that as long as the government acts within the bounds of the
law, its conduct should not be relevant. For example, proponents of this
theory might argue that it does not matter whether a defendant converts
cocaine into crack at a government agent's insistence. The defendant is
still guilty of distributing drugs and should not be given a lesser sentence
because of his own stupidity. The Seventh Circuit has succinctly stated
the policy reasons why the judiciary should not scrutinize law
enforcement conduct at sentencing:
Our inclination, however, is not to subject isolated government
conduct to a special brand of scrutiny when its effect is felt in
sentence, as opposed to offense, determination. If we are willing
to accept the assumption apparently approved by Congress that
dealing in greater quantities of drugs is a greater evil, it is not
clear to us what the precise legal objection to governmental
behavior based on cognizance of relative penal consequences in
this area could be.
In the context of a traditional entrapment defense, the Supreme
Court has stated that law enforcement's conduct should not be a basis
131. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
132. United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300,306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994).
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for entrapment because the judiciary should not have a "veto over law
enforcement practices which it [does] not approve. 33 It is somewhat
puzzling that some circuits have adopted a standard that focuses on the
government's action for sentencing entrapment when that standard is
inappropriate in a traditional entrapment scenario. 34
Conversely, there are those who argue that the government needs to
play "fairly" and that government misconduct is relevant to sentencing.
The argument is that the Guidelines create an opportunity for mischief
because the "incremental sentencing ranges create the potential for
sentencing abuse by [the] government,"'35 and the structure of the
Guidelines does not "adequately consider the terrifying capacity for
escalation of a defendant's sentence." '36  The Guidelines create a
potential for abuse when an officer convinces a defendant to cook
cocaine into crack, 37 gives a defendant a machine gun instead of a
handgun,13 or continues drug transactions until a certain weight of drugs
are seized.39
The reasons for considering the government's conduct in the
sentencing entrapment context are similar to the reasons for considering
the government's conduct in an entrapment defense. Justice
Frankfurter eloquently espoused the policy for considering the
government's conduct in his concurrence in Sherman v. United States."
He stated:
Insofar as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration
of criminal justice, the federal courts have an obligation to set
their face against enforcement of the law by lawless means or
means that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice, and
to refuse to sustain such methods by effectuating them....
Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of
133. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). However, in Russell the Court
did reserve the possibility that outrageous government conduct could exist. Id. at 431-32.
134. But see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 25, § 5.2(b) (discussing the burgeoning support
for the objective approach to entrapment, noting that it is preferred by most commentators,
and that it is the approach taken in the Model Penal Code).
135. United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996).
136. United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992).
137. See United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 102
F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
138. See United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 163 F.3d 1501, 1502-05 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. Barth, 788 F. Supp. at 1057.
140. 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the
transcending value at stake.'
The principal articulated 'by Justice Frankfurter that courts need to
prevent law enforcement from using unjust means to attain their end is
relevant to sentencing entrapment. It is particularly relevant in the
context of crack, where the Guidelines have created great potential for
abuse because the sentence by weight for crack is much greater than the
sentence by weight for cocaine. '  This "distinction presents an
unparalleled opportunity for law enforcement to increase the sentence
of a defendant with relatively little effort.""' When law enforcement
acts to increase a defendant's sentence based on the crack/cocaine
discrepancy, this behavior "strikes at the very heart of our system of
justice.""' In this situation, the judiciary must "stand as a bulwark
against overreaching by law enforcement... to achieve justice under
[the] law."'
If one accepts that law enforcement's manipulation of sentences in
this manner is contrary to our systemic notion of justice, then perhaps
an objective approach is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
system. Inducing a defendant to convert cocaine into crack merely to
increase his sentence "undermin[es] the defendant's due process
rights... [and] must be viewed as outrageous., 146  However, the
converse of that argument is that a government agent insisting on
receiving crack cocaine instead of powder cocaine is not particularly
outrageous conduct because it was the defendant's choice to convert the
powder cocaine into crack.1
41
The outrageous government conduct standard that some circuits
apply as part of the objective approach poses a problem because of the
extreme nature the conduct must meet to satisfy that standard. The
Tenth Circuit analyzes sentencing factor manipulation using an
outrageous government conduct standard.'48 The standard is not clearly
141. Id. at 380.
142. See Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 109.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 112.
146. Id. at 111.
147. See United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
148. See United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996).
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defined, but it is exceedingly high.4 9 For a finding of outrageous
government conduct, the government's actions must be "so shockirig,
outrageous and intolerable that it offends 'the universal sense of
justice.'"'' 0  The reason for having such a strict standard "is due in
primary part to the reluctance of the judiciary to second guess the
motives and tactics of law enforcement officials."'' However, it is clear
from the widely varying approaches taken by different circuits on this
issue that some courts are more willing to second-guess law enforcement
than others. Outrageous government conduct has become a mechanism
that allows a court to reserve the possibility that sentencing entrapment
may exist without ever finding sentencing entrapment.' 52
Outrageous government conduct is, in many Ways, a stillborn
principle that has a limited, if any, application under the federal courts'
current standards.' This is partially why the Seventh Circuit has
rejected the doctrine altogether.'54 In the Seventh Circuit, government
misconduct "is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the
materiality of the infringement of the defendants' rights."' 5 What is
clear is that in jurisdictions that apply an objective standard and require
outrageous government conduct as a prerequisite to a finding of
sentencing entrapment, the defendant has almost no chance of success.
Another flaw with the objective approach is that the Guidelines do not
seem to support such an approach.'56
The objective approach is attractive because it addresses the policy
of ensuring that courts do not condone law enforcement conduct that
does not comport with "rationally vindicated standards of justice.""'
149. Id. at 964. The Lacey court notes that the Tenth Circuit has never found
outrageous government conduct, but that "does not suggest that the defense is unavailable,
but merely bears testament to its narrow scope." Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id. (quoting United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding
government conduct was not outrageous but reserving the possibility that such a case may
someday arise); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191,196 (1st Cir. 1992).
153. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239,241 (7th Cir. 1995).
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.




As discussed above, there are policy considerations that both
support and undermine applying the subjective and objective
approaches. At least one judge was unsatisfied with these approaches
and suggested applying a third approach.'58 That approach is to depart
downward because the government's conduct in manipulating the
sentence takes the case "'outside the heartland' encompassed by the
provisions of the sentencing guidelines because the Sentencing
Commission simply did not contemplate, nor would it countenance,
maximal sentencing as a law enforcement objective."'59  Thus, the
defendant's sentence should be adjusted downward "to a level which
fairly reflects [the defendant's] culpability."'"o An outside the heartland
departure has a different statutory basis than Notes Twelve and
Fourteen. 6' The difficulty with using an outside the heartland departure
in the sentencing entrapment or manipulation context is that this type of
departure may only be applied in situations "not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines."'62 Because Notes Twelve and Fourteen address sentencing
entrapment in the drug context, it seems an outside the heartland
departure is only appropriate if conduct at issue does not involve drugs
or otherwise falls outside the scope of Notes Twelve and Fourteen.'63
V. CONCLUSION
Sentencing entrapment is an unfortunate byproduct of the
Guidelines. When the Guidelines shifted discretion from judges to
prosecutors and law enforcement, it created an enormous opportunity
for abuse. It should be apparent from this Comment's discussion of the
objective and subjective approaches that these approaches as currently
applied are inadequate to deal with this complex problem. Perhaps, a
tenable solution is to shift some discretion back to district judges, as
they seem to be best equipped to conduct the type of factual analysis
required to determine if sentencing entrapment has occurred. While it
may be unclear whether giving judges increased discretion is an ideal
158. See United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 986 (8th Cir. 1999) (Bright, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See USSG § 5K2.0 (2001); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92-96 (1996).
162. USSG § 5K2.0.
163. See id. at §§ 5K2.0 and 2D1.1, cmt. nn.12, 14.
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approach to dealing with sentencing entrapment, it is clear that the
current approaches are inadequate, and perhaps the time has come to at
least consider shifting some discretion back to the judiciary.
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